I think you know what said.canpakes wrote: ↑Sun Jul 06, 2025 4:01 amYour phrasing is weird so I’m not sure what you’re asking, but given that I mentioned the interview in the first place which led to you beginning this thread, yes. I’ve seen the interview.
Here’s a link to that, too -
https://m.youtube.com/watch?v=vOTgPEGYS2o
Churchill's account is as follows:Markk wrote: ↑Sat Jul 05, 2025 10:04 pmChurchill was rightfully concerned that they were losing power and were too dependent on America and the the Soviet Union was going to get way too much of eastern Europe.Chap wrote: ↑Sat Jul 05, 2025 8:59 pm
I think you must be referring to the October 1944 meeting between Churchill and Stalin in Moscow? It was no more secret than any other of the meetings between representatives of western Allies and Stalin had been, and Churchill kept Roosevelt fully informed of what took place. Apart from discussing plans for the post-war division of Germany, which in principle the UK, USA and the Soviet Union were agreed on, Churchill attempted to get some guarantee that the people of Poland would have a voice in the future of their country - which is after all the formal motive for which Britain had declared war on Germany in 1939. Of course Stalin ended up doing what he had always intended to do, and the Iron Curtain descended across Europe, with a Soviet puppet government in Poland and other countries on the Soviet side of the curtain.
Can you give us a reference to a contemporary source to support your apparent belief that suggests that Churchill's attempts to get guarantees for Poland had something to do his concerns about the British Empire?
Churchill did not tell Roosevelt about the "Naughty document" until after it was presented to Stalin the next day or so, and there was not any US representative at the table.
"Harriman" was of course Averell Harriman, who was American ambassador to the Soviet Union from October 1943. He is stated to have been present at Churchill's meeting with Stalin, and Churchill refers to him in his message to Roosevelt. You would therefore appear to be wrong in saying "there was not any US representative at the table." Do you have a contemporary source that says that Harriman was not present at the meeting with Stalin, despite what Churchill writes here?Churchill, Winston. Triumph and Tragedy: The Second World War, Volume 6 (covers 1944–45, published 1953)
Chapter 15 October in Moscow
WE ALIGHTED at Moscow on the afternoon of October 9, and were received very heartily and with full ceremonial by Molotov and many high Russian personages. This time we were lodged in Moscow itself, with every care and comfort. I had one small, perfectly appointed house, and Anthony another near by. We were glad to dine alone together and rest.
At ten o’clock that night we held our first important meeting in the Kremlin. There were only Stalin, Molotov, Eden,
Harriman, and I, with Major Birse and Pavlov as interpreters. It was agreed to invite the Polish Prime Minister, M. Romer, the Foreign Secretary, and M. Grabski, a grey-bearded and aged academician of much charm and quality, to Moscow at once. I telegraphed accordingly to M. Mikolajczyk that we were expecting him and his friends for discussions with the Soviet Government and ourselves, as well as with the Lublin Polish Committee. I made it clear that refusal to come to take part in the conversations would amount to a definite rejection of our advice and would relieve us from further responsibility towards the London Polish Government. The moment was apt for business, so I said, “Let us settle about our affairs in the Balkans. Your armies are in Rumania and Bulgaria. We have interests, missions, and agents there. Don’t let us get at cross-purposes in small ways. So far as Britain and Russia are concerned, how would it do for you to have ninety per cent predominance in Rumania, for us to have ninety per cent of the say in Greece, and go fifty-fifty about Yugoslavia?” While this was being translated I wrote out on a half-sheet of paper:
Rumania Russia 90% The others 10%
Greece Great Britain ( in accord with U.S.A.) 90% Russia 10%
Yugoslavia 50-50%
Hungary 50-50%
Bulgaria Russia 75% The others 25%
I pushed this across to Stalin, who had by then heard the translation. There was a slight pause. Then he took his blue pencil and made a large tick upon it, and passed it back to us. It was all settled in no more time than it takes to set down. Of course we had long and anxiously considered our point, and were only dealing with immediate war-time arrangements. All larger questions were reserved on both sides for what we then hoped would be a peace table when the war was won. After this there was a long silence. The pencilled paper lay in the centre of the table. At length I said, “Might it not be thought rather cynical if it seemed we had disposed of these issues, so fateful to millions of people, in such an offhand manner? Let us burn the paper.” “No, you keep it,” said Stalin.
I also raised the question of Germany, and it was agreed that our two Foreign Ministers, together with Mr. Harriman, should go into it. I told Stalin that the Americans would be outlining to him during the course of our future discussions their plan of operations in the Pacific for 1945.
* * * * *
We then sent a joint message to Roosevelt on our first talk.
Prime Minister and Marshal Stalin to President Roosevelt 10 Oct. 44
We have agreed not to refer in our discussions to Dumbarton Oaks issues, and that these shall be taken up when we three can meet together. We have to consider the best way of reaching an agreed policy about the Balkan countries, including Hungary and Turkey. We have arranged for Mr. Harriman to sit in as an observer at all meetings where business of importance is to be transacted, and for General Deane to be present whenever military topics are raised. We have arranged for technical contacts between our high officers and General Deane on military aspects, and for any meetings which may be necessary later in our presence and that of the two Foreign Secretaries, together with Mr. Harriman. We shall keep you fully informed ourselves about the progress we make. We take this occasion to send you our heartiest good wishes and to offer our congratulations on the prowess of United States forces and upon the conduct of the war in the West by General Eisenhower.
I now reported privately to the President.
Prime Minister to President Roosevelt 11 Oct. 44
We have found an extraordinary atmosphere of goodwill here, and we have sent you a joint message. You may be sure we shall handle everything so as not to commit you. The arrangements we have made for Averell are, I think, satisfactory to him, and do not preclude necessary intimate contacts, which we must have to do any good. Of all these I shall give you a faithful report.
2. It is absolutely necessary we should try to get a common mind about the Balkans, so that we may prevent civil war breaking out in several countries, when probably you and I would be in sympathy with one side and U.J. with the other. I shall keep you informed of all this, and nothing will be settled except preliminary agreements between Britain and Russia, subject to further discussion and melting down with you. On this basis I am sure you will not mind our trying to have a full meeting of minds with the Russians.
3. I have not yet received your account of what part of the Pacific operations we may mention to Stalin and his officers. I should like to have this, because otherwise in conversation with him I might go beyond what you wish to be said. Meanwhile I will be very careful. We have not touched upon Dumbarton Oaks, except to say it is barred, at your desire. However, Stalin at lunch today spoke in praise of the meeting and of the very great measure of agreement that has been arrived at there. Stalin also in his speech at this same luncheon animadverted harshly upon Japan as being an aggressor nation. I have little doubt from our talks that he will declare war upon them as soon as Germany is beaten. But surely Averell and Deane should be in a position not merely to ask him to do certain things, but also to tell him, in outline at any rate, the kind of things you are going to do yourself, and we are going to help you to do.
Harriman, claimed otherwise in his memoirs,Chap wrote: ↑Sun Jul 06, 2025 4:19 pmChurchill's account is as follows:Markk wrote: ↑Sat Jul 05, 2025 10:04 pm
Churchill was rightfully concerned that they were losing power and were too dependent on America and the the Soviet Union was going to get way too much of eastern Europe.
Churchill did not tell Roosevelt about the "Naughty document" until after it was presented to Stalin the next day or so, and there was not any US representative at the table.
"Harriman" was of course Averell Harriman, who was American ambassador to the Soviet Union from October 1943. He is stated to have been present at Churchill's meeting with Stalin, and Churchill refers to him in his message to Roosevelt. You would therefore appear to be wrong in saying "there was not any US representative at the table." Do you have a contemporary source that says that Harriman was not present at the meeting with Stalin, despite what Churchill writes here?Churchill, Winston. Triumph and Tragedy: The Second World War, Volume 6 (covers 1944–45, published 1953)
Chapter 15 October in Moscow
WE ALIGHTED at Moscow on the afternoon of October 9, and were received very heartily and with full ceremonial by Molotov and many high Russian personages. This time we were lodged in Moscow itself, with every care and comfort. I had one small, perfectly appointed house, and Anthony another near by. We were glad to dine alone together and rest.
At ten o’clock that night we held our first important meeting in the Kremlin. There were only Stalin, Molotov, Eden,
Harriman, and I, with Major Birse and Pavlov as interpreters. It was agreed to invite the Polish Prime Minister, M. Romer, the Foreign Secretary, and M. Grabski, a grey-bearded and aged academician of much charm and quality, to Moscow at once. I telegraphed accordingly to M. Mikolajczyk that we were expecting him and his friends for discussions with the Soviet Government and ourselves, as well as with the Lublin Polish Committee. I made it clear that refusal to come to take part in the conversations would amount to a definite rejection of our advice and would relieve us from further responsibility towards the London Polish Government. The moment was apt for business, so I said, “Let us settle about our affairs in the Balkans. Your armies are in Rumania and Bulgaria. We have interests, missions, and agents there. Don’t let us get at cross-purposes in small ways. So far as Britain and Russia are concerned, how would it do for you to have ninety per cent predominance in Rumania, for us to have ninety per cent of the say in Greece, and go fifty-fifty about Yugoslavia?” While this was being translated I wrote out on a half-sheet of paper:
Rumania Russia 90% The others 10%
Greece Great Britain ( in accord with U.S.A.) 90% Russia 10%
Yugoslavia 50-50%
Hungary 50-50%
Bulgaria Russia 75% The others 25%
I pushed this across to Stalin, who had by then heard the translation. There was a slight pause. Then he took his blue pencil and made a large tick upon it, and passed it back to us. It was all settled in no more time than it takes to set down. Of course we had long and anxiously considered our point, and were only dealing with immediate war-time arrangements. All larger questions were reserved on both sides for what we then hoped would be a peace table when the war was won. After this there was a long silence. The pencilled paper lay in the centre of the table. At length I said, “Might it not be thought rather cynical if it seemed we had disposed of these issues, so fateful to millions of people, in such an offhand manner? Let us burn the paper.” “No, you keep it,” said Stalin.
I also raised the question of Germany, and it was agreed that our two Foreign Ministers, together with Mr. Harriman, should go into it. I told Stalin that the Americans would be outlining to him during the course of our future discussions their plan of operations in the Pacific for 1945.
* * * * *
We then sent a joint message to Roosevelt on our first talk.
Prime Minister and Marshal Stalin to President Roosevelt 10 Oct. 44
We have agreed not to refer in our discussions to Dumbarton Oaks issues, and that these shall be taken up when we three can meet together. We have to consider the best way of reaching an agreed policy about the Balkan countries, including Hungary and Turkey. We have arranged for Mr. Harriman to sit in as an observer at all meetings where business of importance is to be transacted, and for General Deane to be present whenever military topics are raised. We have arranged for technical contacts between our high officers and General Deane on military aspects, and for any meetings which may be necessary later in our presence and that of the two Foreign Secretaries, together with Mr. Harriman. We shall keep you fully informed ourselves about the progress we make. We take this occasion to send you our heartiest good wishes and to offer our congratulations on the prowess of United States forces and upon the conduct of the war in the West by General Eisenhower.
I now reported privately to the President.
Prime Minister to President Roosevelt 11 Oct. 44
We have found an extraordinary atmosphere of goodwill here, and we have sent you a joint message. You may be sure we shall handle everything so as not to commit you. The arrangements we have made for Averell are, I think, satisfactory to him, and do not preclude necessary intimate contacts, which we must have to do any good. Of all these I shall give you a faithful report.
2. It is absolutely necessary we should try to get a common mind about the Balkans, so that we may prevent civil war breaking out in several countries, when probably you and I would be in sympathy with one side and U.J. with the other. I shall keep you informed of all this, and nothing will be settled except preliminary agreements between Britain and Russia, subject to further discussion and melting down with you. On this basis I am sure you will not mind our trying to have a full meeting of minds with the Russians.
3. I have not yet received your account of what part of the Pacific operations we may mention to Stalin and his officers. I should like to have this, because otherwise in conversation with him I might go beyond what you wish to be said. Meanwhile I will be very careful. We have not touched upon Dumbarton Oaks, except to say it is barred, at your desire. However, Stalin at lunch today spoke in praise of the meeting and of the very great measure of agreement that has been arrived at there. Stalin also in his speech at this same luncheon animadverted harshly upon Japan as being an aggressor nation. I have little doubt from our talks that he will declare war upon them as soon as Germany is beaten. But surely Averell and Deane should be in a position not merely to ask him to do certain things, but also to tell him, in outline at any rate, the kind of things you are going to do yourself, and we are going to help you to do.
And Personally....I would think that if dividing up parts of Europe was to be decided, Churchill should not have only told Roosevelt, but had approvals of the plan by him and his administration.Churchill records that while his words were being translated he wrote out the percentages on a half-sheet of paper, adding a 50-50 split for
Page 357
The same guilty impulse that prompted Churchill to suggest burning the paper a few minutes after writing down the percentages doubtless led him not to tell Harriman of his strange bargain with Stalin, except in bits and pieces, spaced over several days. On October 10, for example, unaware that the question had been decided, Harri¬ man reported to Roosevelt: “On matters in the Balkans, Churchill and Eden will try to work out some sort of spheres of influence with the Russians, the British to have a free hand in Greece and the Russians in Rumania and perhaps other countries. The British will attempt to re¬ trieve a position of equal influence in Yugoslavia. They can probably succeed in the former but I am doubtful about the latter objective.” In a joint message to Roosevelt the same day, Churchill and Stalin said no more than: “We have to consider the best way of reaching an agreed policy about the Balkan countries including Hungary and Turkey.”
Page 358
But Harriman did not learn that percentages had been committed to paper until midmorning on October 12, when he called on the Prime Minister at the guesthouse provided for him by the Soviet government.
Page 358
“I vividly recall Churchill’s being in bed, where it was his custom to dictate letters and memoranda,” Harriman later wrote. “He read me a letter he had drafted for Stalin, giving his interpretation of the percentages agreed to at their first meeting three days earlier. I told him that I was certain both Roosevelt and Hull would repudiate the letter, if it was sent. At this point Eden came into the bedroom and Churchill said to him: ‘Anthony, Averell doesn’t think that we should send this letter to Stalin.’ The letter was never sent and I believe that my warning to Churchill persuaded him not to go ahead with it.* https://archive.org/details/specialenvo ... ercentages
That raises a good question.huckelberry wrote: ↑Mon Jul 07, 2025 1:45 amI am not the expert but I am fairly sure those percentages did not determine how things actually sorted out.
I would imagine Stalin walking away ,"whatever " spoken under his breath.
I don't think our discussion on this point is of vivid interest to other readers of this board, but just in case ...Markk wrote: ↑Sun Jul 06, 2025 6:20 pmHarriman, claimed otherwise in his memoirs,Chap wrote: ↑Sun Jul 06, 2025 4:19 pm
[...]
"Harriman" was of course Averell Harriman, who was American ambassador to the Soviet Union from October 1943. He is stated [in the account by Churchill which I quoted] to have been present at Churchill's meeting with Stalin, and Churchill refers to him in his message to Roosevelt. You would therefore appear to be wrong in saying "there was not any US representative at the table." Do you have a contemporary source that says that Harriman was not present at the meeting with Stalin, despite what Churchill writes here?
[...]
The book is not written by Harriman himself, although it frequently quotes words he wrote and statements he made. It is therefore not the same kind of source as Churchill's memoirs. It is a mistake of historical method to treat it in the same way. Please note that I am not saying here that nothing Elie Abell wrote is a full and true account of events. I am just saying pointing out that it is a different kind of source.This masterful narrative, written by Elie Abel and based on Averall Harriman's personal recollections as well as his voluminous and revealing private papers, re-creates and explains the climate in which many of the most important strategic and political decisions were made during World War II, and casts new light on the motivations and personalities of the leaders who made them.
