Fact Checking Nelson's "Doors Of Death" light aircraft near death experience

[drumdude]

Occam’s razor applies here.

Rusty lying is by far the simplest explanation. To make Rustys story true you have to go down a rabbit hole of increasingly unlikely events.

Maybe we could have some sort of Bayesian analysis to determine the truth?

[Doctor CamNC4Me]

the pilot secured the affected engine and elected to continue to his destination while letting the fire burn. He then deplaned the passengers and put out the engine (oil) fire with a portable fire extinguisher.

If this guy worked for me I'd fire him (no pun intended).

That's irresponsible.

It is, regardless the incident in question, as noted by Lemmie, was handled iaw the company’s procedure. Again, it was an emergent situation, the pilot corrected for it, and the pilot followed procedure. It’s clearly the basis for the story and there’s nothing to lead us to believe the more outrageous claims made by Russell M. Nelson happened, and outside of that it’s just ‘woulda coulda’ in order to kinda sorta create some wiggle room to justify Russell M. Nelson’s embellishments.

- Doc

[Gadianton]

Welcome to the forum azflyer.

I can certainly accept the point that going on to the final destination with an engine fire is a bad move. I think the documented account, bad move or otherwise, simply shows that we're a couple notches down on the critical meter from where the Tin Man has it. What if your options were continue to the destination or land in a "farmer's field"? I've read field landings are also dangerous.

"Pilots of twin-engine airplanes may elect to continue the flight to the nearest airport" -- (see link below)

The part I was stuck on is the "death spiral". I was not able to find documentation suggesting that a twin engine should "dive" to put out the fire.

In the case of an engine fire, a high airspeed descent could blow out the fire. However, the weakening of the airplane structure is a major concern and
descent at low airspeed would place less stress on the airplane

The recovery from an emergency descent should be initiated at a high enough altitude to ensure a safe recovery back to level flight or a precautionary landing.

There is a lot of room for interpreting what Rusty is describing. Clearly, to me, he's going for effect, and I can't see how his words are intended to mean anything short of a movie scene with a plane nose down and spiraling about the axis of the plane's length, out of control. Those defending (even as devil's advocate only) Rusty's account paint a picture that I don't think any audience member has in mind when listening to the talk: that of a controlled, corkscrew descent -- "When initiating the descent, a bank of approximately 30 to 45°" -- and now it comes down to how scary a realistic descent is for the passengers.

That's a tough call, as context is everything. If the descent is rather gradual and the captain explains, "ladies and gentlemen, our engines and electrical system is gone and we'll now attempt a crash landing in the ocean" then that's different than a relatively steep descent, but the pilot says, "Hang on folks for a rapid descent as we blow this flame out, it's going to get rough but don't panic as this is a standard procedure; we'll be gliding nice and easy again shortly". As you point out the middle-management downplays damage, but so also will the pilot downplay any risk to the passengers. Yes, the descent would be akin to a children's rollercoaster -- an old school adult coaster such as the Cyclone of Coney Island has a 55 degree drop, barely anything by today's standards -- and with the insecurity of something being wrong with the plane, certainly there will be panic. But if we're really talking about a banking spiral as opposed to a "plummeting" war-movie spiral, and factoring in the standard practice of the procedure, and also the words of comfort from a pilot completely in control, then for Nelson to subjectively interpret the experience as a war-movie spiral where death was certain and the plane spared from impact a moment before vaporizing into the earth, implies that he was himself panicking. Some people are more vocal than others. That a woman on the plane was screaming is no worse than he quietly exaggerating the situation to himself as the NBC drama that it never was.

Nelson is in a fork:

If he fabricated the experience, then he's a loser for lying, and if the experience is real under the "banked blowout" interpretation, then he's a loser for panicking when a reasonable person with nerves of steel and a secure knowledge of the Savior would have recognized that his odds of landing unscathed were far greater than the instant death he was certain of.

[DrW]

azflyer,

I'm not discounting the seriousness of an engine out situation in a twin, only showing that Dr. Moore's comments were based on evidence. As you may have seen from reading upthread, I'm a commercial pilot with multi-engine and instrument ratings. Practicing proper engine out procedures during flight training for the multi-engine rating usually resulted in a increased heart rate, sweaty brow, and a need for a clean shirt by the time we landed.

The first time I recall feeling really comfortable with the procedure was when getting checked out in a Beech Queen Air. At lower altitude with only two of us on board and tanks half full, that beauty hardly seemed to notice. However, I have no illusions about the risk of flying an engine-out twin.

As you no doubt know, an in-flight engine failure in a light twin that results in an accident is more likely to be fatal than an engine failure resulting an an accident in a single engine aircraft. Many pilots conclude from this statistic (which has indicated the same for at least the last half century) that twins are no safer than singles. Many experts agree. It's hard to put it any better than this author:

With two starters, four magnetos, 12 cylinders, and 24 spark plugs, it’s a minor miracle that piston twins manage to fly at all.

A lot of cantankerous machinery needs to operate in perfect harmony just to get a twin airborne. And when things go wrong—such as in-flight engine failures—history shows piston twins are no safer than afflicted singles. In fact, engine failures that result in accidents are more likely to be fatal in twins.

That soothing rumble and hum of a second spinning disk may make pilots and passengers feel good. But chocolate-covered raisins do the same thing for me, and “happy food” has as little to do with the successful outcome of most general aviation flights as a second engine.

https://www.aopa.org/news-and-media/all ... sus-single

Our company had the Queen Air because the owner always wanted one, using it for business allowed him to write it off, and we often needed to carry more than 3 or 4 people at a time. Compared to most piston engine singles, twins get a more people where they are going in less time.

[honorentheos]

Occam’s razor applies here.

Rusty lying is by far the simplest explanation. To make Rustys story true you have to go down a rabbit hole of increasingly unlikely events.

Maybe we could have some sort of Bayesian analysis to determine the truth?

Technically speaking, applying Occam's Razor here can't tell you the state of Russell M. Nelson's mind or intentions. What it suggests is he isn't someone that can be trusted to be careful with facts.

Early in the thread the various evolving accounts were collected and made it clear the story was being inflated. The inclusion of the introduction to his autobiography from 1979, the earliest account, exposed that his interpretation of the event had drastically shifted as well. His telling went from the event causing him to reflect on mortality and that he needed to secure his spiritual legacy with his family in the mid-1970s to being about his stoic calm in the face of what he perceived to be his final moments.

While this wasn't immediately exposed with the OP, the thread collected the various accounts for comparison and presents a reasonable case for the story's evolution, and the unreliability of Russell M. Nelson in presenting it.

From here, one isn't applying Occam's Razor. Seeking to cut away at the added bits of the story to get to what is most likely by using comparison of a lay person's account of what happened on a small airplane flight with what a trained pilot would know and how they would respond isn't good investigative hygiene. The sophistication of the descriptions distract from their additive nature, and assumptions get made. Lack of evidence in the form of news reports and NTSB reports in online databases, treated properly, suggest reduced probabilities of certain versions of the story being accurate, but caution warranted acknowledging one is developing a probability being assigned to each version of the story being published not just the most dramatic ones. And with that one didn't advance much further beyond the likelihood the later accounts are mythologized versions. But the existence of an actual event that caused Russell M. Nelson to reflect on his mortality no where near being less probable than probable. The thread invested heavily in trying to reduce that probability, assumptions and assertions became cold facts to some, some might even call it a bullseye against Russell M. Nelson being, well, something, and somewhere in there were a few rather disgraceful moments regarding what could be classed incidents compared to accidents, gaps in database information, and post-Mormon testimonies were strengthened and shared.

[DrW]

There is a lot of room for interpreting what Rusty is describing. Clearly, to me, he's going for effect, and I can't see how his words are intended to mean anything short of a movie scene with a plane nose down and spiraling about the axis of the plane's length, out of control. Those defending (even as devil's advocate only) Rusty's account paint a picture that I don't think any audience member has in mind when listening to the talk: that of a controlled, corkscrew descent -- "When initiating the descent, a bank of approximately 30 to 45°" -- and now it comes down to how scary a realistic descent is for the passengers.

Hello Dean Robbers,

What you are describing here as a spiral,"- plane nose down and spiraling about the axis of the plane's length, out of control-" is closer to a spin.

Spins are the result of improper stall recovery, wherein the inside wing remains stalled, and the aircraft autorotates about that wing. If allowed to develop, spins can lead to loss of control of the aircraft. Steep spins are scary but recoverable - the sooner the better. One reason the high wing Cessnas are popular as trainers is because they are well behaved in a spin, from which recovery is not difficult if started early.

Flat spins can be non-recoverable, and can easily result in loss of the aircraft. As mentioned upthread, spins are prohibited in the Piper Navajo.

The difference between steep spins and flat spins in a low wind design aircraft (model) is well illustrated in this video. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dCG5xdy4k10As

In a spiral dive, on the other hand, neither wing is stalled and all control surfaces maintain their authority. This means that the pilot can use the ailerons and rudder to roll out of the spiral when he or she choses to do so.

With regard to "out of control" part, Russell M. Nelson's description of the spiral death dive in more than one of his descriptions left the clear impression that the pilot had lost control of the aircraft and was desperately fighting to restart the left engine, regain control, and save the day.

My main problem upthread with the death spiral dive described Russell M. Nelson was this: with both engines out, as he claimed, the pilot would have been wasting altitude that could have been used to reach an airport (new heading would have been provided by ATC as as a matter of course in response to the declaration of an emergency).

As recommended in the Navajo operations manual, with an engine fire (and in the no-power situation described by Nelson), the pilot could have (should have) used a straight line or slow turning dive in the direction of the airport to gain the airspeed needed to extinguish the fire and not have risked being forced to glide to a farmers field without power had the fire not extinguished and the left engine not started by a miracle. If there was still altitude remaining once near or over the airport, then altitude could have been dumped as azflyer suggested. This would have been the safer way to handle the emergency if both engines were really out.

[Moksha]

At the MD&D board, they've painted a picture of the Delta airport being indistinguishable from a farmer's field (unpaved runway, crops, and perhaps animals). Was any of that true or was it just apologetics?

[Doctor CamNC4Me]

At the MD&D board, they've painted a picture of the Delta airport being indistinguishable from a farmer's field (unpaved runway, crops, and perhaps animals). Was any of that true or was it just apologetics?

It’s probably true!



I don’t see an airport, do you?

- Doc

[DrW]

At the MD&D board, they've painted a picture of the Delta airport being indistinguishable from a farmer's field (unpaved runway, crops, and perhaps animals). Was any of that true or was it just apologetics?

Delta Municipal has a lighted and marked asphalt runway in excellent condition.

Runway 17/35
Dimensions: 5502 x 75 ft. / 1677 x 23 m
Surface: asphalt, in excellent condition

Weight bearing capacity:
Single wheel: 16.0
Runway edge lights: medium intensity
RUNWAY 17 RUNWAY 35
Latitude: 39-23.468930N 39-22.562833N
Longitude: 112-30.129717W 112-30.134925W

Elevation: 4759.4 ft. 4753.0 ft.
Traffic pattern: left left

Runway heading: 166 magnetic, 180 true 346 magnetic, 360 true
Markings: nonprecision, in good condition nonprecision, in good condition
Visual slope indicator: 2-light PAPI on left (3.00 degrees glide path) 2-light PAPI on left (3.00 degrees glide path)
Runway end identifier lights: yes yes
Touchdown point: yes, no lights yes, no lights
Obstructions: 15 ft. road, 310 ft. from runway, 7:1 slope to clear none
Airport Ownership and Management from official FAA records
Ownership: Publicly-owned
Owner: DELTA CITY
76 NORTH 200 WEST
DELTA, UT 84624
Phone 435-864-2759
Manager: DENT R. KIRKLAND
76 NORTH 200 WEST
DELTA, UT 84624-9440
Phone 435-864-2759

The apologists at MD&D could always simply call and ask.

https://www.airnav.com/airport/KDTA

[Lem]

The airport opened in June 1943.[3] The airport's runways were last resurfaced around 1989

It seems the delta, Utah airport has been around for a long time.